War on Many Fronts

Ukraine’s counteroffensive is often evaluated on the number of square kilometers that have been retaken, and this is one way to measure it. It’s the wrong way, but it is very popular and easy to understand. According to the Insitute for the Study of War, before 24 February 2022, Russia occupied 42,000 sq. kilometers. After the full-scale invasion, the territory expanded to 161,000 sq. km (27%). Since then, Ukraine has liberated 74,443 sq. km, leaving Russia in at least partial control of 18% of Ukraine’s internationally recognized territory. I say ‘partial control’ because there is active partisan resistance almost everywhere, ranging from informants to saboteurs to outright militarized resistance. Instead of massing its forces for a single attack in one location, Ukraine has opted to attack nearly every possible front, forcing Russia to spread its forces thin. This approach offers Ukraine several advantages. <h2>Ukrainian Forces Disposition</h2> Ukraine has three main forces in order of ascending combat effectiveness. First, the Territorial Defense Forces which man the Belarussian border and many spots within the country itself, preventing Russian saboteurs, rooting out spies and collaborators, and generally providing security behind the lines. They man checkpoints throughout the country, guard railroad and other transportation assets, and critical infrastructure. They are made up of the least suitable recruits for combat, such as men over 45–50, those with light injuries, or those otherwise less fit for combat duty. <a href="https://medium.com/@dylan_combellick/war-on-many-fronts-126d7b8ab95f">Read More</a>